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Getting together or breaking apart? Trade union strategies, restructuring and 
contingent workers in Southern Europe  
Andreas Kornelakis 
Horen Voskeritsian 
Abstract: The article considers the strategies of trade unions towards the 
representation of call-centre workers. Using a comparative case study, it examines the 
divergent union responses to the growth of contingent labour by looking at the 
telecommunications industries in Italy and Greece. Although the trade unions in Italy 
pursued inclusive strategies embracing the call-centre workers and negotiating the 
restructuring of the whole sector, the unions in Greece followed a policy of exclusion 
leaving call-centre workers outside representation and negotiating their internal 
restructuring. The article argues that the different union identities, and the diverse 
power resources and internal organizational politics help explain the variation in the 
trade unions’ strategic responses. 
Keywords: Contingent employment; Trade union strategies; Telecommunications 
industry; Italy; Greece. 
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Introduction 
During the late 1990s and early 2000s, the telecommunications industry across 
Europe went through important structural shifts, underpinned by liberalization, 
privatization and technological change (Batt et al., 2009). As a result, work and 
production were restructured, and the trade unions were faced with the strategic 
challenge of responding to this new reality. An added complexity was the increased 
use of contingent workers in the industry, especially in call centres - a sector that 
epitomises characteristics of low-wage work in new service activities (Russell, 2008). 
The introduction of precarious workers in the labour process undercut agreed 
collective agreements and posed a threat to the core workforce. Faced with this 
challenge, the trade unions had to decide how to accommodate the rise of atypical 
employment in their structures and strategic plans. As is well known by the literature, 
in those early years, responses across Europe varied. The German unions, for 
instance, decided to follow a strategy of exclusion or tacit acceptance (Holst, 2008; 
Shire et al., 2009), whereas the Dutch and Austrian unions adopted a more inclusive 
approach (Jaarsveld et al., 2009; Shire et al., 2009). 
The institutional environment has been suggested to influence the way unions respond 
to strategic challenges from the external environment (Czarzasty et al., 2014; 
Doellgast, Nohara, et al., 2009). Other authors, however, have focused on the role of 
the unions’ power resources and internal organisational politics as possible 
explanations (Benassi and Dorigatti, 2015; Benassi and Vlandas, 2015; Gumbrell 
McCormick, 2011). Although there is an abundant literature on the responses of trade 
unions to contingent employment and the factors underlying their behaviour (Heery, 
3	
	
2009), our understanding of why unions may favour one strategy over another 
remains controversial. 
 The aim of this article is to explore this issue in more detail, by focusing on the 
strategic responses of the Italian and Greek telecommunications unions to the 
challenges of restructuring and the growth of contingent labour. Italy and Greece 
share many common institutional characteristics and the telecommunications industry 
in both countries has gone through similar structural changes. Despite this, the 
strategic responses of the unions in the two cases differed. On the one hand, the trade 
unions in Italy pursued inclusive strategies embracing the call-centre workers and 
negotiating the restructuring of the industry On the other hand, their counterparts in 
Greece adopted a policy of exclusion and negotiated only the incumbent operator’s 
restructuring.  
To better appreciate the aforementioned variation in the strategic choices of the 
unions, we conducted a historical case study analysis, utilising archival material from 
various primary and secondary sources (such as newspapers, trade union publications 
and EIRO reports); supplemented by interviews with key actors in the 
telecommunications trade unions in Italy and Greece. The article, therefore, presents 
novel empirical material from two case studies that belong to the Southern European 
employment regime (Holman, 2013: 492), which is an under-researched institutional 
context in the broader call-centre literature. This line of inquiry is even timelier in the 
context of the current crisis that exacerbates phenomena of precarious and low paid 
employment in EU’s periphery (O’Sullivan and Royle, 2014). 
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Theoretical background 
Recent years have witnessed the growth of contingent labour, rendering the 
‘traditional worker with a standard employment contract…a declining species’ and 
making ‘insecurity…the new normality’ (Gumbrell McCormick and Hyman, 2013: 
33). The call centre industry features prominently in this new reality of flexibility and 
insecurity, by employing large numbers of part-time and agency workers who usually 
work side-by-side to the core workforce. The liberalization and privatization of the 
telecommunications industry took place across the developed world during the 1990s 
and 2000s. These structural shifts exacerbated the problems and challenges that the 
co-existence of a peripheral and core workforce posed for the labour movement and 
the organization of work (Doellgast, 2008; Doellgast, Nohara, et al., 2009; Ramirez et 
al., 2007). Trade unions in the US and several EU countries were presented with new 
strategic dilemmas as to how to react to the re-organisation of work and of the 
production process. Additionally, the trade unions had to seriously consider how to 
deal with the advent of atypical workers, whose interests were perceived as being 
non-coincidental with that of their existing members.  
The initial responses to the latter dilemma ranged from exclusion of the contingent 
workers from the trade unions’ structures, to the subordination of their interests to 
these of the core workforce (Gumbrell McCormick, 2011; Heery, 2009). Atypical 
workers were quite often used as ‘buffers’ by the trade unions in their negotiations 
with the employers, to advance and protect the interests of their traditional 
membership (Heery, 2004). This attitude could partly be explained by the fact that the 
interests and needs of the temporary workers did not necessarily coincide with that of 
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the core workforce, whose ‘secure position [rested] on the insecurity of the former’ 
(Heery, 2004: 441). It can also be  partly explained by the implications that the 
inclusion of atypical workers could have on the structure of the unions (Gumbrell 
McCormick, 2011; MacKenzie, 2010). Although unions across the EU responded to 
the challenge of contingent labour differently, a common element in their approach 
was that they were less concerned about representation than about opposing this kind 
of work per se (Gumbrell McCormick, 2011: 298). 
Yet in time the attitude of the trade unions started to change. The unions realized that 
atypical work became an important and permanent characteristic of the labour market. 
In fact, many contingent workers, especially women, preferred this status to the more 
typical one (Gumbrell McCormick, 2011: 298) and therefore, exclusion and 
subordination gave its place to inclusion and engagement (Heery, 2009),. 
Increasingly, unions began to accept the status and the interests of atypical workers as 
legitimate and sought to represent them both at the national and company level. They 
did so by recruiting them as part of their organizing campaigns and many scholars 
went as far as to argue that the distinctiveness of their interests required ‘tailored 
systems of representation’ (Heery, 2009: 431). That way many unions addressed the 
problems that the inclusion of atypical workers could have posed to the existing 
structures, since organizing them ‘into an entirely separate union is structurally easier 
than accommodating them within existing union bodies’ (Gumbrell McCormick, 
2011: 302). 
Recruiting and organizing contingent workers, and bargaining on their behalf, were 
two of the various trade unions’ strategic responses to the advent of flexible 
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employment. Other strategies included the participation of union officials in various 
networks that supported people who were usually employed in this kind of jobs (e.g. 
mainly women, youth and migrants). Additional strategies involved coalition-building 
with NGOs and community organizations and the provision of services tailored to 
atypical workers. Finally, unions took direct action to alter and improve the legal 
framework that regulated flexible work through the lobbying of the government and 
other political parties (Conley and Stewart, 2008; Gumbrell McCormick, 2011; 
Heery, 2009; Heery et al., 2003; Pernicka, 2005). 
Why did the trade unions respond this way and what determined their decision to 
include or exclude atypical workers? One may distinguish between the macro-factors, 
which focus primarily on the institutional environment, and the micro-factors, which 
examine in more detail the internal organisational forces that shape the unions’ 
strategic choices. 
As previously mentioned, the rise of contingent work in recent years was undoubtedly 
an important push factor, since growth of this type of employment created a demand 
for representation (Benassi and Dorigatti, 2015; Fiorito and Jarley, 2012; Heery, 
2009). Yet this fact alone cannot account for the dynamics in the changing attitudes of 
unions towards atypical workers (moving, that is, from exclusion and subordination to 
engagement). It also cannot account for the choice of particular strategies (i.e. 
organizing, or political representation). To better address this issue, a considerable 
body of literature has focused on the importance and the effects of the institutional 
environment on trade union strategies (Czarzasty et al., 2014; Fiorito and Jarley, 
2012; Holst, 2008). 
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Institutions define the ‘structure of opportunities and constraints in which union 
organizations formulate their strategic choices and interact with other actors’, and 
influence the union’s identity (Benassi and Dorigatti, 2015: 4). The trade unions’ 
response to the challenge of restructuring and the advent of contingent labour is 
determined by the opportunities for strategic action the institutional context provides. 
Different structures for the expression of collective voice give rise to quite different 
reactions to restructuring (Doellgast, 2010: 391). As Doellgast (2008: 284) rightly 
argues, ‘worker representatives remain embedded in their respective political and 
economic environment and are dependent on labour laws and bargaining 
arrangements to gain advantage at the bargaining table’ (see also Doellgast, Nohara, 
et al., 2009). Indeed, the structure of the national industrial relations system 
(Gumbrell McCormick, 2011) and of collective bargaining in particular (Czarzasty et 
al., 2014) inform the strategies of unions with respect to contingent labour. As Holst 
(2008: 41) has demonstrated, the structure of collective bargaining in Austria allowed 
telecommunication unions to bargain collectively without requiring much grassroots 
support By contrast, their German counterparts had to engage into rank-and-file 
recruitment and mobilization to force employers into collective bargaining. Moreover, 
the decentralization and deregulation of collective bargaining across Europe meant 
that many unions operating in a context of liberalization had to shift from an 
enterprise union logic to an industry-wide logic (Benassi and Dorigatti, 2015). This is 
why they  began attracting and mobilizing members in a micro-organizational context 
(Czarzasty et al., 2014; Heery, 2009). 
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The role of the national and industry level unions is important in this respect. This 
was certainly true in the case of the US (Fiorito and Jarley, 2012). It was also true in 
many European countries, whose industrial relations system depended on the 
resources and strategies that federations and confederations would decide to devote in 
representing atypical employees (Czarzasty et al., 2014). Yet the institutional context 
alone cannot always account for the unions’ decision to choose one strategy over 
another. As Holst (2008: 27) observes, ‘institutions endow trade unions with specific 
constraints [but] they do not prescribe their behavior’. To better appreciate the choice 
of a specific strategy one also needs to consider the micro-foundations of the unions’ 
behaviour. 
Central in this debate is the role of union identity and union ideology in framing its 
actions (Gumbrell McCormick, 2011). As Heery (2009: 440) argues, in recent years 
the trade unions’ perception of contingent labour changed considerably. This 
happened through the development of a new discourse regarding the position of 
contingent workers that helped framing their interests in a more positive light. This 
was the result of both direct pressure from atypical workers and indirect pressure from 
the women’s movement, as well as grass root mobilization by local union leaders 
(Czarzasty et al., 2014). Combined with the general trend of membership decline, 
union leaders became more open to the contingent workers’ concerns, especially since 
they constituted an important pool of new members.  
Although a union’s identity can shape its response towards certain categories of 
workers, the way it will influence its overall strategy depends more on the size and 
the quality of its power resources, as well as the internal organizational politics and 
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conflicts. Benassi and Dorigatti (2015) argue, for example, that if the union’s 
institutional and organizational power resources are low, it will opt for a strategy of 
inclusiveness or subordination If, on the other hand, its institutional and 
organizational power resources are stable, it will opt for a strategy of subordination 
and alliance with the management (ibid). This may indeed be true in some cases, such 
as in Germany or Britain, where the unions had realized that the non-inclusion of 
atypical workers could lead to a decline of their ability to act (Gumbrell McCormick, 
2011). But it does not necessarily hold true for every case, because this argument 
presupposes that strong membership is fundamental to a union’s power. 
While numbers are important, the mobilization literature (Kelly, 1998) suggested that 
one may be able to achieve results even with low membership, as long as one is able 
to successfully mobilize one’s existing members. Moreover, a union can draw power 
from other sources as well, which suggests that there are different categories of union 
power (Gumbrell McCormick and Hyman, 2013). The type of workers the union 
organizes provides it with structural power, which increases the more skilled and 
specialized its members are. Moreover, a strong and inspiring ideology establishes a 
moral or communicative power, which can be used to successfully mobilize its 
members. Additionally,  its collaborative or coalitional power, i.e. the union’s ability 
to form alliances across society (Frege and Kelly, 2003), be it with the state or NGOs, 
may also be utilized without necessarily the need to directly involve its rank-and-file 
in any action. Similarly,  the smart use of resources – its strategic or logistical power 
– may prove important in a context of scarce resources. Finally, the institutional 
environment per se can be a source of power; but as Gumbrell McCormick and 
10	
	
Hyman (2013: 31) argue, this kind of power ‘may prove precarious in the long run… 
[as the] unions may face a choice between defending their institutional status or 
recovering their representational capacity’. 
Identifying a union’s power resources may help one better appreciate how a union 
may act under certain circumstances. Since power is limited, unions must need to 
make a strategic decision regarding the rational allocation of their power resources to 
achieve the maximum outcomes. This decision will be based on an appreciation of the 
ability of their existing power bases to help them reach their goals. If a union reckons 
that it does not have enough power to achieve its aims then it may decide to invest in 
building up new power resources. This implies that a union may decide against 
expanding its membership base – by representing for instance precarious workers – if 
it deems that the benefits of doing so may not necessarily outweigh the costs. Instead, 
it may focus on developing or utilizing other types of power. If, for example, a union 
believes that it can achieve its strategic goals by utilizing its coalition or structural 
power, it may have little incentive to mobilize alternative power sources.  
The key in the above analysis is to understand how the unions articulate their goals 
and what determines the decision to either use the existing power bases or to develop 
new power bases. Both these elements can help explain whether a union will engage 
into certain actions – for instance, to represent atypical workers or to engage in 
negotiations regarding the restructuring of its sector. The outcome of these decisions 
depends on the union’s internal organizational politics (Anonymous) and the quality 
of its internal democracy. Unions are not monolithic organizations, but represent 
collective organizations that synthesise different ideologies and factions whose co-
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existence may rest on a fragile balance. An appreciation of the dynamics that develop 
at the leadership level, and within its various decision-making bodies, is an important 
empirical question that can help us better appreciate a trade union’s strategic choices. 
As a concluding remark, the decision to encompass a particular strategy, and thus 
utilize one’s restricted power sources, depends on the bargaining setting in which the 
union finds itself, or the behaviour of its major interlocutors – the state and the 
management. Operating within an adversarial context will require a different mix of 
power resources than if operating in a collaborative environment. The union’s ability 
to control, or engage with, the aforementioned actors, will largely determine the 
choice of its strategy mix. 
Research design and data sources 
The research design follows the comparative case study approach (Mahoney, 2004; 
Przeworski and Teune, 1970) and the case selection is theoretically motivated on the 
basis of similar cases with different outcomes. The cases of Italian and Greek 
telecommunications industries are selected because they share a similar institutional 
context, which is close to the ideal-type of the Southern European employment 
regime (Holman, 2013). Both sectors shared the traditions of state-owned monopoly 
telecom operators, with strong unionization (Negrelli, 1996; Zambarloukou, 2010). 
The product market context is also similar, as the EU liberalization process equally 
affected both cases. The opening up of the markets resulted in increased competition, 
a prolonged period of restructuring for the incumbent operators, and a growth of 
contingent labour especially in call-centres. Yet the trade union responses to these 
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challenges differed sharply. The overall timeframe of the case studies refers to the 
period between 2005 and 2010. The case studies trace the trade unions’ strategies 
towards call centre workers.  
The data for the case studies come from archival and documentary sources, namely 
reports from the European Industrial Relations Observatory (EIRO), articles from 
Greek and Italian newspapers and sectoral magazines, and press releases from trade 
unions. More specifically, the larger research project on which this article is based 
consulted a total of: 19 Reports from the European Industrial Relations Observatory; 
8 articles from Italian newspapers (La Stampa, La Reppublica, Corriere della Sera); 
16 articles from Greek newspapers and magazines (Ethnos, Kathimerini, To Vima, 
Eleftherotypia, Weekly Telecom, Aristera!, Technikoi Dromoi);and 6 trade union 
press-releases and announcements. The data were analysed following a thematic 
content analysis approach by continuous reading and re-reading them to construct 
emerging themes and identify paths, processes and patterns. The data were 
triangulated with a combination of documentary sources to enhance validity and 
credibility. EIRO database was chosen as the most representative and authoritative 
source for industrial relations’ developments in Europe. Any political biases arising 
from newspapers’ political orientation were overcome by consulting newspapers 
across the political spectrum from left to right. Finally, this archival research was 
supplemented by face-to-face semi-structured interviews with Italian and Greek trade 
unionists. More specifically, supplementary interviews were held with four trade 
union officials coming from two major Italian unions (CGIL, CISL), and three trade 
unionists coming from Greek trade unions (OME-OTE, Wind, SMT). The average 
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length of interviews was 1.5hrs. Field visits took place in Rome (May and November 
2010) and in Athens (April-May and August 2011). 
Trade unions strategies towards restructuring and contingent workers in Italy 
and Greece 
Representing the outsiders: Italian unions and the Almaviva call centres 
The liberalization of the sector and the privatization of Telecom Italia transformed the 
landscape in the Italian telecommunications sector. The intensification of competitive 
pressures was steered by new entrants such as Vodafone, Wind and BT Italia. The 
Italian trade unions managed to avoid a ‘race to bottom’ in wages and working 
conditions for core telecoms employees by negotiating a sectoral agreement in 2002 
and then a second one in 2005 that set minimum standards across the sector. 
The signing of the 2005 national industry agreement provided a regulatory anchor for 
the sector (Anonymous). For as long as call centres remained ‘in-house’, the national 
contract would ensure homogeneous employment standards for call-centre employees. 
However, call-centre services became increasingly important for customer care and 
sales. New specialised companies emerged in the sector, offering ‘customer relations 
management’ (CRM) services. The main telecoms operators began outsourcing the 
relevant business functions to those firms (prominently Almaviva), which in turn 
operated outside the limits set by the national agreement (Santi, 2007). In its effort to 
keep labour costs as low as possible, the Almaviva Group relied extensively on 
‘freelance’ work contracts for call-centre operators. Almaviva had an incentive to 
resort to an extensive use of freelance contracts, because it avoided several costs that 
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would have to be paid for a regular open-ended contract. This includes sickness and 
accident benefits; maternity leave; paid holidays; yearly bonus, etc. For instance, 
about 70 per cent of the call-centre workers were women (Santi, 2007), so maternity 
leave would potentially represent a serious cost for the company. 
The outsourcing to Almaviva Group captured the attention of the three larger Italian 
telecoms unions: SLC-CGIL, FISTEL-CISL and UILCOM-UIL. Notably, it opened 
up the opportunity for firms to circumvent the regulations imposed by the national 
agreement. Indeed, Telecom Italia, TIM and WIND had fully outsourced their call-
centres to Almaviva by 2005. This was a clear instance of ‘free-riding’; while the 
telecoms firms took advantage of the social peace benefits of the national agreement, 
they avoided the application of minimum standards to call-centre employees. 
The strategic response of the Italian trade unions to this challenge was to forge a 
coalition with the state, and thereby, use the latter’s coercive power to exert pressure 
on employers. The unions used their political influence and liaised with successive 
Ministers of Labour to regulate call-centre employment conditions. Importantly, the 
unions began drafting the relevant regulations with Roberto Maroni, the Minister of 
the outgoing centre-Right Berlusconi government (Corriere della Sera, 2006b). The 
advent of a new centre-left government under Romano Prodi in [date] did not disrupt 
the process of regularisation. In June 2006 the Government Circular No. 17/2006 was 
finalised under the newly appointed Minister of Labour, Cesare Damiano (Galetto, 
2006), and stipulated that it was illegal to renew freelance contracts for workers 
supplying online customer care and assistance (‘inbound operators’). The rationale 
behind this decision was that in this type of job there was ‘ample scope to determine 
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beforehand the content, intensity and form of the work undertaken’ (Galetto, 2006). 
According to the Circular, the call-centre companies were allowed to use freelance 
contracts only for operators hired for very short-term promotional and marketing 
campaigns. 
The trade unions also used the Labour Inspectorate’s investigations strategically to 
put extra pressure to employers (Corriere della Sera, 2006a). Although Almaviva 
initially resisted the implementation of the Circular and threatened with dismissals 
(Galetto, 2006), it was unable to withstand the pressure exerted by the Labour 
Inspectorate and eventually reached a deal with the trade unions in December 2006. 
The company agreed to convert the freelance contracts of 6,500 employees into open-
ended contracts, thus regularising the contracts of 97 per cent of its employees (Santi, 
2007). Moreover, it was agreed that Almaviva would join the sectoral employer 
association, ASSTEL (Associazione delle Imprese Esercenti Servizi di 
Telecomunicazioni). This way, the provisions in the telecommunications national 
agreement were extended to also cover call-centre workers. 
Why did the Ministers take the side of the unions on this issue? The short answer is 
that the unions were strategic in using their political clout with both centre-left and 
centre-right governments to achieve their objectives. However, this strategy did not 
reflect any permanent organic relationship with any party or other political cleavages. 
The unions could invite either party to support them, because their links went both 
ways (Interview with CISL trade unionist, 25 May 2010). 
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The agreement reflected the general strategy of the Italian trade unions to support 
government reforms as long as they could regulate the extent of flexibilisation. This 
was congruent with the government’s preferences for flexibility. The Minister of 
Labour, Cesare Damiano, was in the past a leading trade unionist at CGIL and was in 
favour of ‘good flexibility’ (Corriere della Sera, 2006a). After the conclusion of the 
agreement the Minister stated that it was a ‘win-win’ outcome, and encouraged both 
sides to ‘look forward and to ensure homogeneous employment conditions and labour 
cost stability in all call centre companies, guaranteeing thus equal rights for the 
workers and fair competition among the companies’ (Santi, 2007). 
The increase in atypical contracts was an instance of an abuse of the provisions of 
Law No. 30/2003 (known as Legge Biagi), which allowed greater flexibility in the 
labour market. While the unions supported those labour market reforms, the extensive 
use of ‘freelance work’ contracts resulted in excessive precariousness. Thus, it went 
against the unions’ strategy for ‘negotiated flexibility’. The Almaviva group was 
notorious for abusing the system even when performing outsourced tasks for 
government services (such as the Italian Office for National Statistics, ISTAT). Thus, 
the government had an additional reason to put pressure on employers to comply with 
the appropriate implementation of the law. 
Negotiating the industry’s restructuring: Vodafone and Telecom Italia 
The Italian unions’ inclusive strategy is not only evident in the regularization of the 
call-centre workers’ contracts, but also in their approach to the industry’s 
restructuring. They used their political links with the government to put pressure to 
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private sector firms to ensure that the restructuring in the sector was the outcome of 
negotiated solutions.  
In September 2007 the Vodafone Group announced a business branch transfer to the 
specialised transaction processing services company Comdata. This transfer would 
affect about 900 Vodafone employees dispersed across various company locations 
(Tajani, 2008). The trade unions recognised immediately the risks for circumventing 
the rules set out in the national wage agreement. The ‘transfer of employees’ was yet 
another form of outsourcing, and Comdata was not a member of ASSTEL, therefore it 
would not be obliged to abide by its rules and regulations. The unions’ response was 
to hinge on the state’s coercive power to influence the restructuring mode. They 
invited the Minister of Economic Development to informally mediate the negotiations 
with the two firms. Indeed, the Minister responded to this call and mediated the 
agreement between Vodafone, Comdata, and the sectoral trade unions at the premises 
of the Ministry (Tajani, 2008). According to the company agreement’s provisions, 
Comdata was required to apply to the transferred workers the national contract for the 
telecommunications sector, while the company agreement regulated performance-
related pay and other matters. Even more, the same provisions would also apply to 
any future recruits in the transferred branch, to avoid a double contractual regime. In 
the event that Comdata group went bankrupt, Vodafone was obliged to transfer those 
employees to a third party or re-hire them in the Vodafone Group (Tajani, 2008). 
This pattern of negotiations is not only observed in Vodafone, but also in the 
incumbent telecoms operator that comprised most of the unions’ membership. 
Although Telecom Italia remained the largest telecommunications group in Italy, it 
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had already gone through three successive hostile takeovers. Despite earlier efforts to 
restructure, the company was still burdened with more than €35 billion debt. In 2008 
the management announced that redundancies were unavoidable. The unions sought 
to influence the pattern of restructuring, averting outright redundancies and they 
negotiated a relevant agreement in 2008. The agreement stipulated that 5,000 workers 
would be registered onto ‘mobility lists’. Mobility procedures (mobilità) was one of 
the innovative ‘social shock absorbers’ introduced since 1991, mainly for blue-collar 
manufacturing workers, with the aim to facilitate re-entry into work of redundant 
employees (Trentini, 1998). Workers ‘in mobility’ received supplementary benefit 
and were enrolled on a regional ‘mobility list’ (lista di mobilità), while firms that 
hired personnel from the list were entitled to tax concessions. 
The restructuring process continued, and in January 2009, the Telecom Italia Group 
presented its 2009-2011 Strategic Plan specifying the need for further 4,000 
redundancies (Rinolfi, 2009). The trade unions opposed this action and requested the 
intervention by the Minister of Labour of the centre-right Berlusconi government, 
Maurizio Sacconi. The Minister responded, agreeing to act as a mediator, and on 21 
July 2009, a meeting took place at the Ministry, between Telecom Italia management, 
the Telecom Italia RSU (Rappresentanza Sindacale Unitaria), and sectoral 
associations (SLC, FISTEL and UILCOM). After intensive and long negotiations, the 
parties reached an agreement whereby the anticipated redundancies were replaced by 
1,054 ‘solidarity contracts’. This meant that weekly working hours were reduced for 
full-time personnel, turning their full-time contracts into part-time contracts. 
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Still, the market pressures for further downsizing of Telecom Italia were not fully 
averted. In April 2010, Telecom Italia’s revised Strategic Plan for 2011-12 announced 
a total of 6,822 redundancies to be implemented by December 2012. In response to 
this announcement the strategy that the trade unions followed was consistent; they 
invited the Minister of Labour, Maurizio Sacconi and the Deputy Minister of 
Telecommunications to intervene and mediate the conflict. Indeed, the Ministers met 
with representatives from Telecom Italia management and the sectoral unions at the 
Ministry of Economic Development on 14 July 2010 (Sanz, 2010). Following this 
meeting, Telecom Italia suspended the dismissal notices that it had sent to 3,700 
employees, and after a series of meetings, the parties reached an agreement on 4 
August 2010. The main aspects of the agreement included mobility procedures for 
3,900 employees, ‘solidarity contracts’ for 1,100 employees, and suspension of all 
plans to outsource business functions such as information technology, human 
resources, and customer operations, keeping them ‘in-house’ (Sanz, 2010). On the one 
hand, those entitled to be registered in ‘mobility lists’ would be employees who were 
up to 36 months before retirement. On the other hand, employees entitled to solidarity 
contracts would be younger employees, and while their working time and pay was 
reduced, they were expected to attend vocational training programmes so that they are 
retrained. Following this arrangement, the CEO of Telecom Italia, Franco Bernabè, 
declared that ‘the agreement is perfectly in line with efficiency objectives foreseen in 
the Strategic Plan and that, at the same time, it guarantees workers’ protection from 
job losses’ (Sanz, 2010). 
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To sum up, restructuring in the sector was the outcome of persistent negotiations, and 
the state regularly stepped in to facilitate the process.  The unions relied on their 
strength of membership and forged a coalition with the state to increase coverage. 
They represented not only employees in the privatised incumbent operator, but also 
employees in the new entrants.  The pattern of negotiations relaxed some of the 
protection for core employees (insiders) but increased the protection of peripheral 
employees (outsiders). 
Excluding the outsiders: Greek unions and OTE call-centre employees 
Unlike their Italian counterparts, the Greek telecoms union responded to the growth of 
contingent labour with a policy of exclusion. Following the opening up of the sector 
in 2001, the OME-OTE union (Federation of OTE Employees) amended its statute so 
that it is able to accept other organisations as members. However, this change proved 
to be more of a ‘window-dressing’ act. Its eligibility requirements remained strict, as 
it required an organization to have at least 500 members before it is accepted as an 
affiliate. This in practice excluded the new smaller unions in Vodafone and WIND 
(Interview with trade unionist, 27 April 2011). The only union organization that 
became an affiliate to OME-OTE was the one organizing employees in Cosmote, 
OTE’s mobile telephony subsidiary. 
The Cosmote union was established in 2000 with the aim to control the staggering 
expansion of outsourcing. More often than not, some other subcontractor employed 
employees who worked at Cosmote. The Cosmote union managed to minimize the 
extent of outsourcing for Cosmote employees with a series of regulatory attempts. It 
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started by agreeing on General Staff Regulations with Cosmote management in 2002, 
signed its first firm-level agreement in 2004 and subsequently renewed the 
agreements in 2006 and 2008. In this process, the Cosmote union benefited from its 
affiliation with OME-OTE. 
The above policy contradicts the strategy of OME-OTE towards OTE’s call-centre 
employees. The call-centre employees in OTE were also organized in their own trade 
union, the Trade union of employees in OTE-Call centres. The new union sought to 
become affiliate member of OME-OTE, but OME-OTE followed a hard line strategy 
towards them, sticking to the statute’s requirement that a trade union could be 
affiliated with OME-OTE as long as it had at least 500 members (Interview with trade 
unionist, 27 April 2011). The OME-OTE unionists appeared reluctant to represent 
employees without a permanent employment relationship. Since the call-centre 
workers were employed on non-standard employment contracts (e.g. 3-hour or 4-hour 
part-time temporary contracts), they were automatically excluded (Interview with 
trade unionist, 27 April 2011). 
The contrast with the strategy of Italian unionists is sharp. The Greek call-centre 
employees tried hard to become members of the OME-OTE union, but this effort was 
in vain. For instance, a group of call-centre unionists attended the OME-OTE 
Congress in 2009 and requested the floor to express their wish to become members of 
OME-OTE. The organisers were holding them up, denying them the floor repeatedly. 
The call-centre representatives interrupted a speaker to take the floor, bickering 
followed, and at the end the call centre unionists were literally ousted from the 
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congress (Eleftherotypia, 2005). How can one explain this exclusion of call-centre 
employees, despite the acceptance of Cosmote union as an affiliate? 
The answer dwells in the inter-organizational politics underpinned by ideological 
cleavages within the OME-OTE Federation creating ‘them -and- us’ attitudes. In the 
Cosmote union the dominant factions belonged to the socialist and centre-right 
political parties, corresponding to the factionalism in the OME-OTE federation. Since 
those unionists had a compatible political persuasion, they were considered as ‘one of 
us’ and were eventually accepted as affiliates. By sharp contrast, the unionists in the 
call-centres were more radical and leaning towards leftist parties. The prospect of 
accepting the call-centre union as an affiliate of OME-OTE could potentially upset 
the balance of power within OME-OTE factions. The effect would be even greater if 
OME-OTE was compelled to accept members from newly established unions in 
Wind, Vodafone, and Forthnet. Such a prospect would not only jeopardise the balance 
of power within OME-OTE, but might also result in socialist and centre-right 
unionists losing control of OME-OTE’s leadership. In a nutshell, neither the call-
centre union, nor the unions in other telecoms operators were considered for OME-
OTE as ‘one-of-us’ (Interview with trade unionist, 2 May 2011). Even more, trade 
unionists within OME-OTE ranks were attached on ‘holding an office’ and secured a 
range of perks and privileges stemming from their officio. If the federation expanded 
its membership, then the number of positions would be reduced and many old trade 
unionists would be left without ‘office’ (Interview with trade unionist, 27 April 2011).  
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Negotiating the internal restructuring: compensation for core employees 
The policy of prioritizing the protection of insider core employees over the interests 
of peripheral employees is also evident in the actions of OME-OTE during the 
negotiation of the restructuring process. Throughout the 1990s generous severance 
packages facilitated the privatization of OTE. This culminated to the 2005 agreement, 
in which OME-OTE got an extremely generous voluntary exit scheme, in exchange 
for the abolition of the job-for-life tenure for future recruits. The deal between the 
unionists, OTE management, and the Minister of Economy paved the way for the 
subsequent takeover of OTE by Deutsche Telekom. But the agreement was heavily 
criticised by the opposition parties and by the peak labour confederation GSEE 
(Greek General Confederation of Labour). This episode created a rift between OME-
OTE and the new unions in the sector, and highlights further the contrast with the 
Italian unions’ inclusive strategy during restructuring. OME-OTE actions were geared 
towards protecting the interests of a small group of ‘core employees’ rather than 
representing and protecting larger constituencies. 
The use of ‘voluntary exit’ schemes for those close to retirement age was not a new 
practice. Indeed, this was the primary method of restructuring and downsizing, 
negotiated already in a company agreement in 1996. The 1996 agreement set out the 
details of an annual voluntary exit scheme for those close to retirement age, providing 
incentives in the form of minor compensation for earlier exit. It further specified that 
for every ten exits, only one hiring would take place. This process facilitated the 
reduction of the total number of employees from 29,000 in 1996 to 16,000 in 2005 
(To Vima, 2005). However, the cost of the 1996 scheme was miniscule compared to 
24	
	
the one agreed in 2005. The voluntary exit deal of 2005 was estimated to cost €1.6 
billion and would be financed by the state budget and company funds. Apart from 
abolishing job-for-life tenure for future recruits, its main effect would be to further 
downsize OTE, reducing the number of employees from 16,000 to 11,000 
(Eleftherotypia, 2005). 
The abolition of ‘job-for-life’ tenure for future recruits was critical in the process of 
privatization of OTE. That is why both the government and the management put 
immense pressure on the trade unions to accept the deal. Indicatively, in early March 
2005 there was a tripartite meeting between the Minister of Economy, the CEO of 
OTE, and the OME-OTE president and general secretary. In this meeting, the 
Minister and the CEO put pressure to the unionists to accept the deal. A few days later 
the Minister appeared resolved to proceed with the plan, announcing his intention to 
impose the voluntary exit scheme by law, if the OME-OTE union did not agree. 
Additionally, the pressures from about 5,000 employees who would benefit from the 
scheme ‘were very strong, almost unbearable’ (To Vima, 2005). The beneficiaries 
were up to eight years before retirement with the majority of them being between 48 
and 57 years’ old (Interview with trade unionist, 27 April 2011). 
The union leaders finally gave in, and the agreement was eventually ratified by the 
May 2005 OME-OTE Congress. The congress consisted of 300 delegates who 
represented the employees in the company. The delegates were either part of the 
group of beneficiaries, or just didn’t care as long as their own job-tenure was 
safeguarded (Interview with Trade Unionist, 27 April 2011). As a result only a 
minority objected to the plan, and a 77 per cent majority approved the agreement. 
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Still, the agreement provoked severe frictions between the GSEE and OME-OTE and, 
as a result, the president of OME-OTE, who negotiated and signed the agreement, 
was sacked right after the event (Kathimerini, 2005; Interview with trade unionist, 27 
April 2011). 
This deal increased the mistrust within workers in the sector and reinforced the 
pattern of ‘us-and-them’ attitudes. The use of taxpayers’ money to fund an extremely 
generous compensation for only 5,000 early retiring employees aggravated the 
suspicion towards OME-OTE. At best, the unionists in OTE were considered as faint-
hearted, managing to get unionism ‘the easy way’ with the aid of political parties’ 
clientelistic practices and exchanging privileges in return for votes (Interview with 
trade unionist, 2 May 2011). The private sector employees and unionists considered 
the OME-OTE unionists as ‘sold out’ to the management, using unionism as a 
medium for political career and uninterested in representing the workers’ interests 
(Interview with trade unionist, 2 May 2011). 
By contrast, the firm level unions in the new private telecommunications companies 
(Vodafone, WIND, Forthnet) developed in a much more hostile environment, 
compared to the conditions of the public sector. Although unionists in call-centres and 
other telecoms firms were leaning towards leftist ideologies, at the organizational 
level they remained autonomous, distanced from any political party. They sought to 
represent the workers’ interests, rather than play the game of political clientelism.  
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Discussion 
Writing almost half a century ago, Flanders (1970: 15) famously argued that ‘trade 
unions have always had two faces, sword of justice and vested interest’. Although 
trade unions strive to advance a better and more equal employment relationship they 
can also become excluding organisations, for in their attempt to unite ‘one group of 
workers, unions might divide them from others’ (Gumbrell McCormick and Hyman, 
2013: 79). This double-edged identity became more obvious when the trade unions 
began to face important challenges from their external environment, especially the 
changing demographics of the labour market and the rise of precarious employment. 
A pressing need to address these issues emerged and, as was previously discussed, the 
unions’ strategic responses ranged from exclusion to inclusion. How the unions will 
eventually respond to this ‘brave new world of work’ depends on a variety of factors, 
ranging from the institutional environment in which they find themselves, to the 
internal organisation politics and power struggles that may emerge in their attempt to 
reconcile efficiency versus democracy and solidarity (Gumbrell McCormick and 
Hyman, 2013). The different strategic responses of the Italian and Greek 
telecommunications unions to the restructuring of their sector and the advent of 
contingent employment demonstrate these points exactly. 
Although operating in quite similar institutional and product market settings, the 
Greek OME-OTE trade union appeared to follow a ‘vested interest’ approach, 
protecting only the insiders and adopting a policy of exclusion towards precarious 
employees in the sector. By sharp contrast, the Italian unions resembled closer the 
face of a ‘sword of justice’, adopting an inclusive strategy embracing the ‘outsiders’ 
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in the sector by negotiating collective agreements to promote their interests. Despite 
the obvious differences in the unions’ ‘core strategies’ (Holst, 2008), in both cases the 
motivation to engage with this particular behaviour had common roots: the protection 
of the interests of the core workers and of the unions’ respective power bases. 
Contrary to their Greek counterparts, however, the Italian unions decided to follow a 
more inclusive approach to deal with the problem. What explains these variations 
however? The reasons can be found in the different union identities, the internal 
organisational politics, and the diverse power resources each union had at its disposal. 
Contrary to their Greek counterpart, the Italian unions involved in the restructuring 
negotiations and the representation of contingent workers were industrial unions that 
brought with them an industrial-oriented mentality. As Benassi and Dorigatti (2015) 
have argued, industrial unions are more inclined to follow a policy of inclusion 
towards atypical workers, as their main aim is the representation of a whole class of 
workers belonging in the same industry. By doing so, they manage to protect their 
existing clientele and to further advance their associational and organisational power 
(Gumbrell McCormick and Hyman, 2013), by incorporating into their membership 
atypical employees. The Italian unions were transformed into sectoral associations 
during the early privatization phase of the Italian telecommunications industry. This 
further allowed them to mature ideologically and organisationally and to be able to 
speak with a coherent industrial voice when the challenge of restructuring and of the 
undercutting of the collective agreement took place. 
OME-OTE on the other hand, despite its size and national coverage, was basically an 
enterprise-based union and had not managed to develop an industrial identity. 
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Notwithstanding its apparent effort to claim an industrial role by altering its statute, in 
reality this change was never materialised and OME-OTE remained an enterprise 
union representing employees solely in the OTE group (i.e. in OTE and Cosmote). 
The lack of an industrial identity and ideology may explain the union’s attitude 
towards employees from other telecommunication companies, but does not account 
for its reluctance to represent OTE call centre employees. To better appreciate this, 
one needs to consider the internal organisational politics in OME-OTE. 
As is typical with Greek trade unions (Kouzis, 2007; Kritsantonis, 1998), OME-OTE 
is also an amalgamation of various political factions that are usually structurally 
linked to the major political parties represented in parliament. These political linkages 
had been extensively used in the past, especially by public sector unions, to achieve 
concessions by playing out the government’s electoral motives. However, in recent 
years, Greece has experienced the growth of a new form of grass-root trade unionism, 
of mainly leftist political orientation (Kretsos and Vogiatzoglou, 2015); such was the 
nature of the small trade union founded by OTE’s call centre employees. As 
mentioned before, the ‘old regime’ in OME-OTE perceived this effort as a threat to 
the union’s political equilibrium, and decided to sacrifice solidarity by adopting a 
‘them-and-us’ attitude to preserve its traditional domain. In the Italian case, on the 
contrary, the three industry unions were able to speak with a single voice, because of 
their industrial logic, and their autonomy and distance from the political parties. The 
development and allocation of the unions’ power resources was also heavily 
influenced by the relationship they had with the political establishment. 
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Although both countries are characterised by a corporatist model of employment 
relations, whereupon the trade unions are closely associated with political parties 
(Hyman, 2001), in the case of Italy the unions appear to have managed to disengage 
themselves from the political parties’ direct influence. Since the early 1990s (after 
Tangentopoli) there was no clear alignment between the new political parties and the 
three confederal unions, CGIL (Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro), CISL 
(Confederazione Italiana Sindacati Lavoratori), and UIL (Unione Italiana del Lavoro). 
Even more, the unions’ membership became more diversified, and union leaders 
enjoyed renewed legitimacy from the wider society, because they were not involved 
in the scandals. As a result their institutional role was upgraded. In essence, Italian 
unions constituted a quasi-political party, which neither left nor right governments 
could ignore. In our case, the three telecoms unions were able to leave political 
differences aside and to use their association and organisational power to press the 
state to mediate in the restructuring of the sector and to push for the regularisation of 
call-centre employees. 
This was certainly not the case with OME-OTE. Although the union was also very 
strong in terms of union membership, it primarily utilised its privileged access to the 
corridors of power to achieve its aims. During the negotiations for the industry’s 
restructuring, the union managed to reach an agreement by capitalising its links with 
the ruling government, and exploiting the latter’s need to negotiate quickly and with 
minimum interruption OTE’s privatization. 
To recapitulate, the different union identities, internal organisational politics and the 
diverse power resources help us appreciate the strategic choices of the Greek and 
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Italian telecommunications unions. The Greek OME-OTE did not manage to develop 
an industrial identity, but instead remained an enterprise union whose leadership was 
keenly interested in preserving the status quo by raising entrance barriers to those who 
could disturb the sensitive internal political equilibria. Following on the tradition of 
public sector unionism, it reacted to the challenge of privatization by playing out the 
government’s electoral motives to easily achieve concessions for the company’s core 
workers.  
On the other hand, the Italian unions managed to develop an industrial identity from 
early on, and to internalise the logic of compromising with employers and the state. 
Since the 1990s, the Italian unionists were much more pragmatic when carving out 
their strategies and more willing to accept the government agendas for reform (for 
instance, on liberalisation, privatisation, and labour market flexibility). As far as 
liberalisation is concerned they sought to protect their members from a ‘race to the 
bottom’ in wages; or to ease out the social costs of adjustment to business 
restructuring with bi-partite welfare funds. With regard to labour market flexibility, 
they did not reject it en bloc but put limits on the extent and nature of flexibility. 
Finally, having decided not to depend on their political links to achieve their aims, 
they focused on the development of their associational and organizational power 
resources as a means to advance their interests. This explains their decision to 
represent contingent employees rather than merely the core workforce. 
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Conclusion 
The article examined the strategies of the Italian and Greek telecommunication unions 
towards the restructuring of their sector and the growth of contingent labour in call 
centres. This line of inquiry is placed within the broader literature considering how 
trade unions may shape labour market segmentation in a comparative institutional 
perspective (Batt et al., 2009; Doellgast, Batt, et al., 2009). The main aim was to 
explain the divergent trade union responses to similar challenges in liberalised 
telecoms sectors. The comparative sectoral case studies that belong to the Southern 
European employment regime (Holman, 2013: 492), were also suitable to gauge the 
wider applicability of the insights offered by the existing literature. Although the trade 
unions in Italy pursued inclusive strategies embracing the call-centre workers and 
negotiating the restructuring of the industry, their counterparts in Greece followed a 
policy of exclusion leaving call-centre workers outside representation and negotiating 
only the incumbent operator’s restructuring. The diverse trade union identities, power 
resources, and internal organizational politics, as well as the institutional resources of 
unions in the form of access to the state appear to explain the observed variation in 
outcomes.  
The article contributed to the literature by suggesting that the different legacies in 
political unionism and how these play out in internal organizational politics are 
important for the cases at hand. Although this argument appears to explain the 
differences in the two case studies, one needs to be cautious with regard to its 
generalizability, and carefully problematize the ‘universe of cases’ (Ragin, 2004) to 
which this insight might be applicable. On the one hand, the reference to legacies of 
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political unionism appears to be rather idiographic and context-specific to Southern 
European contexts such as France, Spain, Italy and Greece. In those countries the 
links between politics and unionism appear stronger. On the other hand, the concepts 
of union identities, union power, and internal organizational politics appear to have 
wider applicability to different institutional contexts. Thus, it may influence the 
inclusiveness of trade unions’ strategies towards the growth of contingent labour. 
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